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ABSTRACT
Corporations invest considerable resources to create, preserve and analyze their data; yet
while organizations are interested in protecting against unauthorized data transfer, there
lacks a comprehensive metric to discriminate what data are at risk of leaking.
This thesis motivates the need for a quantitative leakage risk metric, and provides a
risk assessment system, called Whispers, for computing it. Using unsupervised machine
learning techniques, Whispers uncovers themes in an organization’s document corpus,
including previously unknown or unclassified data. Then, by correlating the document
with its authors, Whispers can identify which data are easier to contain, and conversely
which are at risk.
Using the Enron email database, Whispers constructs a social network segmented
by topic themes. This graph uncovers communication channels within the organization.
Using this social network, Whispers determines the risk of each topic by measuring the
rate at which simulated leaks are not detected. For the Enron set, Whispers identified 18
separate topic themes between January 1999 and December 2000. The highest risk data
emanated from the legal department with a leakage risk as high as 60%.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
A 2008 study commissioned by Cisco Systems of more than 2000 IT professionals in 10
countries revealed a startling statistic: 39% of these professionals were more concerned
about threats from their peers than external attackers [1]. The reason for this concern?
Almost half of the professionals questioned reported that in addition to employees dealing
with more information than ever before, they are not receiving the proper training in data
security. All this adds up to a shocking statistic: 11% of the professionals reported that
either they or an employee they knew, accessed unauthorized information and sold it for
profit. Personal devices make it ever easier to store data, making the problem of tracking
access increasingly more difficult. According to a May 2009 US federal government report,
American business losses between 2008 and 2009 due to cyber-attacks grew to more than
$1 trillion of intellectual property [2]. Additionally, the impact of unauthorized data trans-
fer goes beyond monetary damages. For example, hackers against the security company
HBGary were sentenced to prison, some with sentences as high as 124 years [3].
From large sums of money, to jail time, the fallout of unauthorized data transfer are
severe. Software such as firewalls, policy checkers, and virus scanners attempt to address
unauthorized transfer, but protecting all data can be insurmountable in both expense or
lost business agility due to strident security. To reduce the costs of protecting one’s data,
one first needs to identify the data truly at risk.
Corporations invest considerable resources to create, preserve and analyze their data;
yet while organizations are interested in protecting against unauthorized data transfer,
there lacks a comprehensive metric to discriminate what data are at risk of leaking. Google
demonstrates a critical business advantage currently hinges on its ability to leverage their
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market data [4]. It stands then that data is valuable, and companies need to actively measure
that value. Within the government space the risk is typically mitigated by clearances and
compartmentalization of clearances. However, data changes quickly. In the face of ever
present change, how does one assess the risk of new unclassified data? Furthermore, how
is that risk changing? Are the people managing that data properly compartmentalized? We
are missing a succinct metric to describe this risk. In a 1921 book on Economics, Frank H.
Knight states that the difference between uncertainty and risk is that risk can be measured
[5]. Without a comprehensive tool to estimate the risk within an organization, leaders are
left with uncertainty about the state of their intellectual property.
This thesis implements a risk assessment system called Whispers to quantify the present
and emerging risk within an organization’s documents. Whispers uses unsupervised ma-
chine learning techniques to summarize documents and correlate them with related docu-
ments. These groups of documents form a topic group. It is essential, however insufficient
to simply classify the data. Classification alone is not a clear measure of leakage risk. Data
does not leak itself. As Cisco established, employees are leaking it [1], ergo the classification
must be put in context of the people who create, maintain and manage that data. Classi-
fication combined with a social network forms a lens to clarify the picture of risk. Ergo,
Whispers then traces the documents within a topic group to the authors, and recipients.
The resulting cluster of people, form a social group of the topic. Whispers then applies a
novel method to estimate a risk metric for each social group. The result is an impartial,
automatic measure that security officers may use to quantify their security procedures and
overall risk analysis.
Whispers discovers potential data leakages by measuring the connectedness of separate
social groups. Whispers uses three primary tools to perform its work. First, topic modeling
discovers the underlying thematic structure of the emails. From the topics, Whispers
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assembles the social groups surrounding those topics. The final predictive block identifies
messages sent between social groups.
This thesis is divided into 2 primary parts. Part one, composed of Chapters 2, and 3
addresses the classification techniques evaluated in the design of Whispers, and summarizes
other works on the problem of data leakage. Chapter 3 describes the design of Whispers
as a risk assessment system. Part two, composed of Chapters 4 and 5, describes the results
of Whispers’ application on the Enron email data set [6] and the future work exposed by
Whispers.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
Whispers is risk assessment system that uses information retrieval techniques. It leverages
machine learning techniques to filter a sea of text to uncover leakage events within an
organization. Hence, the existing research in information retrieval and data mining is
essential to understanding Whispers’ structure and design decisions. To color the related
works in this chapter Whispers defines data leak as Definition 2.1; our focus is on data
leakage via email. This chapter is divided into three primary sections Section 2.1 presents
a preliminary work, Cloud Assure, which exposed the need for a risk metric. Section 2.2
presents Topic Models as an unsupervised technique for extracting underlying themes in
a corpus. Finally, Section 2.3 discusses work with similar goals which attempts to draw
similar conclusions.
Definition 2.1 Data Leak := A leak is sending an email, intentionally, or unintentionally,
containing a particular topic to someone outside that topic’s social group (Definition 2.2).
For example, Alice, Bob, Dave and Eve are employees of a company. If numerous
people write emails to Alice and Bob about a topic on shoes, Alice and Bob form a shoes
social group. Eve is external to the shoes social group. If Dave then emails Eve about shoes,
Dave leaked data.
Definition 2.1 describes just one perspective on the data leakage definition. A more
simple definition is, “data found in an unauthorized place” [7]. Cisco defines a special case
of insider threat data leakage when a former employee fails to return company electronics
[1]. This latter definition is too narrow for our application since Whispers intends to track
risk of leakage for both current and former employees. Thus, the simpler definition is
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more useful, and Whispers’ working definition 2.1 is simply a formal extension, expressing
data leakage as a function of social groups. This offers the option to unambiguously, and
qualitatively measure leakage while a more simple definition is open to interpretation.
2.1 Cloud Assure
Cloud Assure is a preliminary project published as part of the ASU Information As-
surance Conference [8]. Cloud Assure’s focus is to identify leaking emails by evaluating
the trust of the senders and receivers. This project exposed the fact that many data leak-
age solutions require data to be leaked to demonstrate their overall value. This motivates
identifying graduated levels of risk for an organization’s intellectual property.
Figure 2.1, describes the high level structure of Cloud Assure. Essentially, Cloud Assure
accepts email as input, and offers a boolean recommendation if the email should be sent.
If Cloud Assure believes this email was a leak, Cloud Assure recommends not to send.
Cloud Assure uses a Markov Decision Process (MDP) to estimate the potential risk based
on individual’s trust values. The finding however was that the trust metric could be easily
gamed, and users could leak emails undetected, and still maintain a high trust value. Despite
this issue, Cloud Assure made a strong contribution. It showed that emails leak in the
context of their social network. Whispers is an extension of the Classifier block from
Cloud Assure.
Originally, Cloud Assure was designed to be restrictive, such that instead of Cloud
Assure’s recommendation to send the email or not, Cloud Assure would drop the email
if it determined the email would leak. However, this design decision demonstrated that a
restrictive system requires emails to leak in order to build a history of decisions for the
MDP; this is insufficient. Cloud Assure punted this issue by describing a training phase
where the installing organization feeds past email with known leaks to provide a history
for the MDP. How big this history needs to be is left to future work. Whispers started
5
Classifier
Trust Evaluation
Markov Decision
Process
Feedback
{Person, Classification, Document Id}
Figure 2.1: Simplified Block Diagram of Cloud Assure
as the classifier block of Cloud Assure. Cloud Assure needed a mechanism to classify
documents into a sensitivity level. This level was used by the MDP as a leakage tolerance.
The MDP process worked on a graph of the organization. For each email, it constructed
the graph where nodes are users, and edges are past emails between two people. Near the
recipients, the process adds a simulated user with an artificially high reward value. The
MDP then iterates over the graph to see if the email reaches the simulated user. If the MDP
reaches the simulated user it recommends the email not be sent since it believes the email
is a leak.
This is a powerful idea. Cloud Assure demonstrated that the social network provides an
extra dimension to data leakage, and that simulated leaks are an effective tool for detecting
possible leakage paths. This allows us to define a social group (Definition 2.2).
Definition 2.2 Social Group := A social group is the group of recipients corresponding to the
emails clustered by the classification algorithm.
Afterwards however, it became clear that the classifier was too constricting. Cloud As-
sure’s MDP needs a numerical metric that reflects the content of the email. Cloud Assure
uses Bayesian classification to cluster emails into sensitivity levels. This creates sufficient
input for the MDP, but it lacked the ability to group emails of similar content. For exam-
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ple, within an organization, emails about engineering designs, and emails about financial
reports could both be highly sensitive. The Bayesian classifier groups these two together,
however these two subjects are quite different. Intuitively it follows that this content has
different leakage potential, hence differing risks. Furthermore, Bayesian classification re-
quires the groups to be known ahead of time, and installers must provide sufficient training
data for each group. Email is simply too dynamic for this to be maintainable. With the mo-
tivation to build a risk metric established, Whispers needed something that could discover
the classification groups in an unsupervised way. For this purpose, Whispers identified
topic models Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) and its big brother Correlated Topic Mod-
els (CTM) [9], [10]. Topic Models is a machine learning technique to uncover the latent
topics within a set of documents [9]. Topic Models provides the unsupervised dynamic
discovery of topics needed for a maintainable leakage system.
2.2 Topic Models
Whispers extracts underlying “topics” or groups of co-occurring words and tries to cor-
relate communication of those topics with groups of authors and recipients. As mentioned
earlier, simply classifying the documents is insufficient. Cloud Assure established that doc-
uments must be viewed through the lens of the social network. Whispers achieves this by
applying the estimated topics against the set of authors and recipients to estimate leakage.
This set of authors and recipients forms a social group defined in Definition 2.2. Lastly,
since Whispers intends to be an off-line mechanism, unsupervised methods are preferred
to supervised ones. At a high level, if a communique is outside of Whispers’ expectation
of the intended group, Whispers flags such document as a leak (Definition 2.1).
For the results to be meaningful, the topics must be dissimilar hence a reliable distance
metric is essential to sufficiently separate the document clusters. The initial application of
Topic Models for this work resulted in less than stellar results. The essential distance metric,
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the vocabulary was insufficiently culled of vapid words. To improve the identification of
topics we leverage term frequency-inverse document frequency (tf-idf) in Section 2.2.4 to
generate a vocabulary free of nonessential words in an unsupervised way.
2.2.1 Latent Dirichlet Allocation
Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) is a machine learning technique which mathemati-
cally describes the human process of writing a document [11]. For example, a document
is composed of a collection of words intended to persuade or inform the reader. LDA
supposes that the collection of words are related by some list of common themes or topics
[9]. Specifically, LDA supposes documents are written in the following fashion:
1. The author has a finite set of lists. Each list contains a vocabulary for a given topic.
2. The author chooses to start writing a document.
3. The author rolls a die to choose a topic list.
4. The author rolls the die again to choose a word from the selected topic list.
5. The author writes down the word.
6. The author continues rolling the die until the document is of sufficient length.
7. Once the document is complete, the author destroys the topic lists.
From the algorithm’s perspective this process results in documents that look like Fig-
ure 2.2. Each color represents a topic list from which the author randomly selected a word.
The histogram in Figure 2.2 shows the estimated topic proportions within the document.
Most of the literature on Topic Models uses a graphical algebra to represent the random
variables. This method is called Plate Notation [12]. In plate notation:
8
Figure 2.2: LDA’s Generative View of a Document.
1. Rectangles, or “Plates” denote replication.
2. Unshaded circles denote unobserved random variables.
3. Shaded circles denote observed random variables.
4. Arrows denote conditional dependencies.
Figure 2.2 shows an example document and the parameters relating to the LDA Plates.
1. α is the parameter of the Dirichlet prior probability distribution on the per-document
topic distribution.
2. β is the parameter of the Dirichlet prior probability distribution on the per-topic
word distribution.
3. θd k is the topic distribution for document d for topic k.
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4. zd n is the topic for the nt h word in document d .
5. wd n is the nt h word in document d .
6. Nd is the set of words in the document.
7. M is the set of documents in the corpus.
LDA has 3 inputs, the α and β values to set the Dirichlet distribution, and a vocab-
ulary of words. The Dirichlet is used to estimate the distribution of word choices the
author makes when “generating”, i.e., writing a document. As the author chooses words
his choices are not uniform. Each topic in fact has a different distribution over its set
of words. The Dirichlet provides a smooth distribution of topics, i.e., a distribution of
distributions over words. As we’ll see in Section 2.2.3 however, LDA is insufficient for
Whispers’ goals and restrictions on the distribution of words and how those words are
chosen in the generative process will be relaxed.
LDA runs an estimation phase to fit the topic distribution, θ, for each document. The
resulting distribution then uses an inference phase to infer the content of a yet unseen doc-
ument according to the overall estimated topic proportions. LDA provides the basis for un-
supervised classification. LDA is superior to Cloud Assure’s naïve Bayesian classifier in that
it classifies documents according to their content and allows new topics to emerge. Now
financial data will likely be a separate topic from engineering data. This allows the leakage
system to estimate leakage based on content rather than on the overly broad sensitivity
level. LDA has become a fundamental tool for topic analysis [13]. However progress has
generated two further lines of research that can improve Whispers’ performance namely
Topic Chains which introduced a time dimension to LDA, and Correlated Topic Models
(CTM) which provides an extra dependence between topic distributions which allows
Whispers to better estimate documents with varying proportions of differing topics, i.e.,
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not only topics that are similar, but also link together documents that share a common
proportion of common topics.
2.2.2 Topic Chains
Topic Chains is not a classification technique itself, but an extension of LDA to provide
a time dimension [9], [14]. This technique adds additional context to documents allowing
LDA to be more effective with shorter documents.
Kim targeted news articles to show how perspectives, and opinions change over time
[14]. To achieve this, Kim segments a year’s worth of news articles into two week incre-
ments, and fits an LDA distribution against each time slice. Using a similarity metric, Kim
compares each time slice with its immediately previous time slice to assess which topics
continue into the current time slice, which died off, and which topics emerged from the
current time slice. With each time slice linked to the previous related time slice a chain
forms for each topic. The chains show topic trends over time and Kim defines four special
transition cases in Definitions 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5, 2.6.
Definition 2.3 Topic := a topic is a major subject discussed in the corpus.
Examples of topics are “winter Olympics”, “health care reform”, and “the stock mar-
ket”[14].
Definition 2.4 Long-Term Topic := if a topic lasts for a long time, we say it is a long-term
topic.
Examples of long term topics are “the stock market”, “Afghanistan war”, and “educa-
tion”[14].
Definition 2.5 Temporary issue := if a topic lasts for a short time, we say it is a temporary
issue.
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Examples of temporary issues are “the winter Olympics”, “earthquake in Haiti”, and the
“death of Michael Jackson”[14].
Definition 2.6 Focus Shift := a topic chain exhibits different focuses for each individual topic
in the chain.
An example of a focus shift is “Greece, moratorium” to “Europe recession” in the “econ-
omy” long-term topic [14].
Kim further showed how topic chains can adjust the granularity of the extracted topics
[14]. By tuning the similarity metric, more broad or more narrow categories emerge from
the data. On a liberal setting, topic chains identify large categories like the sections of a
newspaper, whereas tighter settings identify individual people, and places. Whispers lever-
ages the topic chain method to fit time slices of emails as it provides a flexible tuning value
for fitting topic similarity. Whispers is primarily focused on identifying risk of topics, and
long-term topics as opposed to identifying when focus shift occurs within an organization.
As a result Whispers uses a tighter similarity setting such that focus shift tends to show up
as a new topic rather than as a shift in an existing one. As we in Section 4.6 a new topic
emerges from a larger one. The new topic demonstrates a clear security violation speaking
directly to the impact Whispers’ can make.
2.2.3 Correlated Topic Models
LDA’s generative processes has a problem however. The θd k parameter which tracks
the topic assigns for words assumes that each word chosen from the topic list is independent.
This is not expressive enough for complex documents with a mixture of topics. When an
author writes more complex documents each word selection is not independent, but rather
part of some influential concept the author wishes to convey. By relaxing this independence
the generative process is more expressive in the documents it can convey, allowing words
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to be part of multiple topics. With respect to data leakage, the word security might relate
to information assurance as much as it relates to a financial security. LDA’s independence
property prevents a word from contributing to multiple topics. Correlated Topic Models
(CTM) however provides an extra dependence between topic distributions which allows
Whispers to cluster a documents with similar content, and within each content cluster
further cluster document with a similar proportion of similar topics. CTM calls this sub-
grouping of similar topic proportions, topic correlation. To enhance LDA’s inability to
estimate topic correlations, CTM uses a different underlying distribution. Rather than
the Dirichlet, with its independence property, CTM uses the logistic normal distribution
[10].
CTM follows LDA’s generative document process in that a document is simply a bag
of words. Also like LDA, CTM is sensitive to the provided vocabulary. Initially trivial
techniques of removing very common and infrequent words resulted in poor topic sep-
aration. These attempts made broad strokes at the vocabulary cutting the 5%, and 10%
frequent, and most infrequent words. This overly broad approach did not improve topic
separation, which led to a preprocessing step of tf-idf.
2.2.4 Topic Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency
Term frequency-inverse document frequency (tf-idf) is an unsupervised technique for
weighting document terms with the intent of filtering out terms which provide no in-
formation [15]. While quite an old technique, tf-idf is used extensively in information
retrieval systems. In fact, Etsy.com the online handmade marketplace uses tf-idf exten-
sively to filter keyword searches of potential customers [16]. Etsy.com is an interesting
application of information retrieval as it demonstrates the importance of words relative to
their domain. It’s common practice to remove stop words, i.e., words used only for syntax
and provide no information. Stop word lists tend to be language specific and for English
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include words such as a, the, they, etc. However some words independently provide value,
yet in the context of their domain provide nothing useful. Etsy.com is a marketplace for
people to sell their hand made items. As a result nearly every item on the site is unique.
While a consumer may highly value hand made goods, the words “hand made” or “unique”
as search terms on the site do not provide any differentiation between items. In a sense,
“unique”, within Etsy.com’s domain is a stop word. Etsy.com uses tf-idf to find these vapid
words and remove them from the search queries so the customer can find what they want
quickly.
Tf-idf works on bag-of-words documents. It counts each word’s frequency relative to its
inverse frequency within the corpus (Equation 2.3). The resulting vectors are unbounded
positive real values. Smaller values denote lesser importance. Equation 2.1 describes the
term frequency (tf) parameter. tf increases proportionally to the frequency of a word in
a document. Conversely, Equation 2.2, the inverse document frequency (idf), decreases
by the frequency of the word in the corpus [17]. Combining them provides a high per
word score for words with high frequency in a few documents, but low frequency overall.
Whispers uses this technique after stop-word removal to further clean the vocabulary prior
to CTM estimation. The equations capture tf-idf, where
1. t is the vector of boolean terms. The term is 1 if the term occurs in document d , 0
otherwise.
2. d is the vector of terms within a document.
3. N is the total number of documents in the corpus.
4. |{d ∈D : t ∈ d}| is the number of documents where the term t appears.
5. max{ f (w, d ) : w ∈ d} is the maximum frequency of any term in the document.
This helps prevent long documents from dominating the term frequency.
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1
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+
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2 · f (t , d )
max{ f (w, d ) : w ∈ d} (2.1)
i d f (t , D) = log
N
|{d ∈D : t ∈ d}| (2.2)
t f _i d f (t , d , D) = t f (t , d ) · i d f (t , D) (2.3)
While tf-idf has proved itself to be quite useful, there is little linguistic basis for it.
Recently there is an effort to backfill grammatical reasoning to this quite useful technique
[18].
2.3 Similar Works
In “Analyzing Group E-mail Exchange to detect Data Leakage”, Zilberman et al. devel-
ops a plug-in for Microsoft OutlookTM to provide users real-time recommendations on the
intended recipients of an email [19]. Users of this system would author an email and add
users to the “to” field. The plug-in then analyzes the content of the email and correlates
that content with the recipients’ social group. If a person in the “to” field is not the social
group, the plug-in recommends that the email not be send to the outside user. Zilberman
et al.’s primary focus was identifying “...the wrong Bob” where an author intends to send
an email to their friend “Bob Saget”, but instead accidentally sends it to their boss, “Bob
Parsons”.
Similar to Whispers, Zilberman et al. uses people clustered into groups according
to common content. However Zilberman et al. uses k-means to group users into social
groups instead of Whispers’ topic model method. Whispers attacks a separate problem
from “...the wrong Bob”. While identifying leaks at the individual level is important
for overall leakage protection, Whispers holds are more macroscopic view of the entire
organization to identify chains and the potential of leaking data from those chains. To
evaluate Zilberman et al.’s method, they simulate leaks by injecting users known to be
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outside the social group to emails and measure their false positive rate. Whispers extends
this method from an on demand per email process to a holistic continuous online process.
Whispers assesses risk by injecting leaks similar to Zilberman et al., but instead of making a
recommendation on the single email, it injects hundreds of simulated leaks and aggregates
its accuracy into a risk value for that topic.
2.4 Summary
Whispers is a risk assessment system that determines what data within in organiza-
tion is truly at risk. Cloud Assure demonstrated that naïve Bayesian is insufficient as a
classification technique for data leakage, but provided keen insight that the social network
enhances the data leakage picture. Using CTM, Whispers is able to cluster documents of
similar content, and further refine those clusters with documents of similar proportions
of similar topics. tf-idf provides pithy input to the topic analysis by culling vapid words.
Thus forms a fully unsupervised processing chain that classifies against content rather than
sensitivity level. The following chapter provides a deeper understanding of the architecture
of Whispers.
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Chapter 3
DESIGN OF WHISPERS
Whispers equates leakage risk with its ability to find a seeded leak. More specifically,
risk is synonymous to the false negative rate, i.e., the rate at which Whispers is unable to
determine a leak occurred (Definition 3.1). Whispers continuously summarizes incoming
emails within an organization. Since data trends over time, it follows that the potential
leakage of that data also changes. With a continuous measurement system in place one may
better assess which intellectual assets are at risk, and potentially how well the company is
protecting them.
Definition 3.1 False Negative := Declaring an email did not leak, when it did.
Whispers provides a per topic risk metric to provide the estimated likelihood the or-
ganization can detect topic leakage. Such a metric allows businesses to focus their effort
on the highly sensitive topics with a corresponding high likelihood of undetectable leaks.
Whispers simulates leaks of various topics, then measures the rate at which it detects the
simulated leak. The false negative rate of this process is the risk metric. If Whispers injects
a leak, and then cannot find it, that speaks to the topic’s volatility or ubiquity within the
organization. If such a topic is also intellectually valuable to the organization, the organi-
zation can focus additional security measures on the topic to improve its security prior to
an incident.
3.1 Architecture of Whispers
Leakage risk is inversely proportional to the likelihood of identifying simulated leaks.
An accurate identification corresponds to low risk, i.e., one identifies that the signal ex-
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TF-IDF
Topic Proportions
Corporate email
Topic Model
Figure 3.1: Block Diagram of Whispers Stage-1 As It Fits the Topic Proportions to the
Corpus
ists, and that it leaks despite the inundation of irrelevant chaff. Conversely, an inaccurate
identification corresponds to high data risk. There are at least two forms of inaccurate
identification. First, if one inaccurately identifies a signal that does not exist, the organi-
zation impedes valid communication by mistakenly thinking data is leaking. Secondly, if
one accurately identifies a signal, but misclassified the data, the organization is wasting
resources protecting irrelevant information.
Whispers assesses risk in two stages. The first stage (Figure 3.1) runs tf-idf, and fits
a CTM to the corpus. CTM outputs topic proportions which are used by the Classifier
block in stage-2 (Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2 shows the five components of Whispers’ computation chain. The solid
lines represent the processing path for email. The dotted lines represent the simulation
side channel which feeds leaks to the Validator. This side channel allows the Validator
to “cheat”, by knowing the actual leak to compare against the computed answer from the
Evaluator.
1. Email database.
2. Classification engine.
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Figure 3.2: Block Diagram of Whispers Application for Continuous Measurement of
Data Leakage Risk
3. Leak injector.
4. Evaluation engine.
5. Validator.
Next, we describe the components.
3.1.1 Email Database
The email database is a collection of all the email at the company. It contains everything
from trivial e-mail exchanges to valuable intellectual property of the organization. While
the information is valuable, it is too costly and error prone to manually classify all emails
in the organization looking for potentially leaking information. Instead Whispers attaches
to the primary email server and runs an unsupervised classification technique to extract
the underlying topics within the organization’s email.
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3.1.2 Classification Engine
The classification engine is divided into two stages, an estimation component and an
inference component. The estimation component summarizes all email up to the current
date and correlates co-occurring words as topics (see Section 2.2.3). This is a computation-
ally heavy process. Once estimation is complete the inference engine can use the estimated
data to infer topics within a yet unseen email. This allows Whispers to infer the content
of an email based on a corpus of past data. This is also an unsupervised process. Once the
email is inferred, its topics are sent to the Evaluator to compare its topic content with the
historical social groups of people.
3.1.3 Leak Injector
The leak injector simulates data leakage by adding new people to the recipient field of
a withheld email. By injecting leaks, Whispers has the benefit of knowing who is leaking
without needing to wait for an actual leakage incident. Being unsupervised, servers can be
set aside to process reams of email to estimate the risk of topics within the organization.
Also a benefit of being unsupervised, Whispers can evaluate emerging topics, i.e., topics of
conversation yet unknown to the security officers of an organization. Whispers evaluates
risk of these new topics as they emerge within the corpus.
The leak injector randomly selects users from the organization’s roster, and adds them
to the To field of the email. This simulates two possible forms of leakage. The first is that a
malicious user sends information to a remote cohort. The second is that an innocent user
unintentionally sends information to an inappropriate person. While the second form
is leakage is more likely, both forms have the same potential result, loss of intellectual
property.
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Once the leak injector adds the name to the email, it forwards the email the organiza-
tion’s leak prevention system, in this case a classification engine. Additionally, via a side
channel, it sends the leaked name to the Validator for closed loop validation of the final
leakage result.
3.1.4 Evaluator
The Evaluator consumes the email with its accompanying classification and correlates
the recipients with a social group. Using the topic distributions from the estimation phase,
the Evaluator assembles a graph describing the social group for each topic. Recall that a
leak is defined as sending an email containing a topic outside of the topic’s target social
group. The Evaluator then compares the To field of the email with the social groups of its
content. If any user is outside the topic group, the Evaluator claims a leak.
If this were a real leak, and not a simulated process to evaluate risk, security officers
have a decision point to alert the user, or drop the email silently. If the email is dropped this
incurs a problem that the social groups of a topic cannot grow, i.e., a topic group remains
static. Imagine a new employee starting at an organization. With such a strict security
profile this employee could never send an email to anyone since such a new user is not part
of any social group. Rules have to be designed to account for such cases. This issue is left
for future work. Once this processing is complete, the Evaluator sends its decisions to the
Validator for final scoring.
3.1.5 Validator
The Validator acts as a validation step and compares the output of the evaluation engine
with the known injected user from the previous module. The Validator outputs the risk
metric as a percentage from Equation 4.1.
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3.2 Summary
Whispers is a general risk assessment system to analyze email and provide a per topic
risk value. The following chapter evaluates Whispers’ performance on a real data set.
22
Chapter 4
RESULTS
Assessing data leakage as a postmortem or audit type activity requires data to be leaked.
Whispers’ method is different. Whispers uses the organization’s real email to feed an inter-
nal quality tracking system. It continuously simulates a leaked email, and sends it through
the organization’s leakage containment system. Whispers tallies the emails which are ei-
ther flagged or passed along, all while knowing which emails are sensitive, and of those
sensitive emails which emails contain simulated leaks. The false-negative rate of data leak-
age, i.e., the rate at which the system incorrectly flags an email as leaking correlates to the
risk of that particular topic. Simulated leaks correlate to real risk, since the system proves
itself unreliable with simulated leaks on real data, it follows it will be at least as unreliable
against a malicious adversary.
4.1 Enron Email Corpus
Whispers is a risk assessment system intended to process email hence it needs an email
corpus. Whispers assesses risk by simulating data leakage and measuring the accuracy of
the simulated leak. A corpus of sufficient size is required to simulate the noise of real
world email communication. Whispers uses the Enron email data set [6] for this purpose.
This dataset contains 255,636 emails concerning both personal and business related topics.
Excluding automated IT messages and infrequent senders, the majority of email is from 150
separate individuals during 1999 and 2001 [20]. Information assurance aside, the dataset
is used extensively in several research areas ranging from business ethics [21], [22], to
computer science topics such as spam detection [23], social networks [24] and artificial
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intelligence [25], as well as psychology papers attempting understanding how humans
communicate [26], [27].
Whispers focus is to identify the topics users are communicating, and determine its
ability to identify incorrect recipients on the email. Enron’s wide topic content is perfect
for this application. Whispers looks at the first seven quarters of the data as shown in
Figure 4.1. Due to computation limits with the implementation, Whispers requires an
exorbitant amount of time to process the successive quarters. The corpus provides an
additional two years of documents, but Whispers’ serial implementation is overwhelmed
by the size of subsequent quarters. While a more parallel implementation will extend
Whispers’ reach, the current implementation is restricted to this subset. Section 5.1.2
provides additional details on this issue.
4.2 Database Versus Flat Files
Databases allow Whispers to better organize of the relationships between topic chains,
the source documents, and the source authors than flat files. The database depicted in
Figure 3.2 represents an organization’s email database such as Microsoft Exchange, Post-
fix or some similar mail server. A database over flat files gives Whispers’ a great deal of
control both as a functional product, but also as a research project. The database features
make it easy to mirror, duplicate, and log data manipulations while still maintaining data
consistency. Whispers’ started as a SQLite [28] backed application until the write perfor-
mance on SQLite became a severe bottleneck for the LDA algorithm. SQLite is a single
file database which makes backup and management of the database easy. The “server” runs
as a library inside the user’s application. While the simplicity is quite enticing, SQLite
has a critical flaw regarding data processing: SQLite supports only one concurrent writer.
Whispers is naively parallel. Each time slice is processed independently hence each quarter
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of Email by Annual Quarters.
is pounding the database. The processing time grew beyond a week for a single year of
email.
Whispers had the option to switch from a database, or as the stock LDA implementa-
tion prefers, to flat files. The value of the database is simply too great to drop, and Whispers
upgraded to PostgreSQL [29]. PostgreSQL has an advanced Full Text Search implemen-
tation built directly into the database query engine. Extending this is MADlib [30], is a
set of python stored procedures backed by fast C++ libraries to perform topic modeling
and other data analysis techniques apropos to Whispers. With MADlib in place, Whispers
started processing email, yet the topics it extracted were quite poor (Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1: Poor Topics Due to Insufficient Vocabulary Pruning.
wednesday its john corp company
take help find power good
had fax good john business
mark were friday very number
monday group work below energy
4.3 Improving Topics with Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency
A critical step in extracting quality topics from CTM is a quality vocabulary. Since
Whispers’ is intended to function unsupervised, it needed an unsupervised method to
prune the vocabulary.
Processing starts with cleaning the text with tf-idf. Initial experiments did not per-
form this cleaning step, and the returned topics were less than useless. The topic model
algorithms work by leveraging co-occurrence of words. The topic model algorithm must
be provided a vocabulary, a list of words which are relevant and useful for the corpus at
hand. If words which convey no information are left in the vocabulary, the topic model is
left to assume the co-occurrence of useless words are somehow useful. Some of the topics
generated by this situation are shown in Table 4.1. On the other hand, Table 4.2 shows the
quality topics which Whispers can extract from the corpus. MADlib is truly a fantastic
library, however it lacked an integrated tf-idf implementation, and the initially extracted
topics needed some serious cleaning. A few supervised attempts were made, but this was
strongly against the design goals of Whispers. This process entailed manually tuning the
Dirichlet α and β to find a reasonable set of topics. This process resulted in topics similar
to Table 4.1, and the cluttered vocabulary prevented the LDA from good separation and
the model was unable to identify any more that five topics. Whispers needed an integrated
tf-idf to clean the vocabulary. Consequently, MADlib was dropped in favor of an open
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Table 4.2: Higher Quality Topics Due to Tf-Idf Vocabulary Pruning
legal energy stock attachment contract
power service market copy transact
product power trade file indian
trade market price trade counsel
meet group buy email deal
source project by Colorado Reed [31]. Reed provides a SciPy [32], Django [33] backed
tool. This tool provided an excellent reference for integrating a tf-idf engine into the topic
modeling processing chain. The result is sufficiently separated topics.
4.4 Chaining Topics
Once each quarter is processed, Whispers links each topic to the previous quarter
using cosine similarity [34]. Each topic is a list of words sorted in order of words most
characteristic of that topic. This list of words forms a vector, and each topic is compared
to the previous quarter’s topic vectors to find the most similar topics. This chains each
topic together allowing Whispers to trace the topic over time. Even as the risk of the topic
changes, the words which build up that topic contribute to the similarity between quarters.
If the cosine similarity is not above a particular threshold, Whispers assumes the topic is
new.
Whispers uses a similarity value of 12%. We tuned this value experimentally by at-
tempting to maximize topic consistency, while minimizing the number of resultant topic
chains. Values smaller that 8% created too many separate chains. Conversely, 15% included
most topics and resulted in many topics matching quarter to quarter. 12% allows Whis-
pers to not only trace topics over time, but also allows Whispers to drop topic chains
when newer evidence demonstrates itself. Topics that are free to emerge as conversations
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Figure 4.2: Topic Chain Showing Quarters Jan 1999 - July 1999. Center Nodes Represent
The Quarter Anchors. Descendent Nodes Represent Documents Part Of That Topic In
That Quarter Time Slice.
increase the co-occurrence probabilities estimated by CTM. Likewise topics with dimin-
ishing probability will fall away from the topic analysis. Each topic, clusters the recipients
into social groups. Whispers has now established the lineage of each topic through the
corpus. Figure 4.2 shows the linking of three quarters of data using this process.
4.5 Risk Estimation
Whispers’ processing chain is nearly complete. The raw emails have been cleaned by
tf-idf and, the resultant vocabulary is processed by CTM to form topics. The topics are
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Figure 4.3: Document Graph for July 1999. Center Node Represent Topic Anchors. De-
scendent Nodes Represent Documents. Notice the Two Clusters in the Bottom-Right
Overlap. This Overlap Demonstrates The Two Topics Share a Number of Documents
Which is a Direct Effect of the Topic Proportion Feature of Correlated Topic Models
(CTM).
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Figure 4.4: Topic Graph of Users for July 1999. Center Nodes Represent Topic Anchors.
Descendent Nodes Represent Users. Notice The Shared Users Between the Top Right Two
Clusters; This Represents Higher Risk Than The Fairly Isolated Cluster on the Middle
Left.
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Figure 4.5: Example Document Graph.
chained together using cosine similarity. Whispers is now left with the task of injecting
leaks and measuring its ability to discern the leaked recipient.
Whispers first assembles two directed graphs. The first graph is a document graph
built from the CTM data by following the likelihood estimates generated by CTM. For
example, take three documents. Document A contains words about fish, and oceans. Doc-
ument B contains words about fish and turtles. Document C contains words about digital-
signal-processor guitars. One builds a vocabulary of these documents using the tf-idf. The
documents, and the vocabulary are given to the CTM algorithm. We then ask CTM to
generate 3 topics. CTM returns 3 topics: 1 about aquatic animals, 1 topics about water, and
1 topic about guitars. CTM also returns an associated topic proportion for each document.
Document A is 50% about aquatic animals, and 50% water. Document B is 100% about
aquatic animals. Document C is 100% about guitars. The document graph then looks like
Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.3 givens a document graph from July 1999. The same CTM step that out-
puts topic lists, also outputs topic distributions for each email. These distributions allow
Whispers to construct a graph connecting the topic as a root node, with directed edges to
each related document. Note that since documents are a mixture of topics, the in-degree
of a document node is not always one. With the document graph, Whispers builds a user
graph by following the recipients of the emails. The user graph forms the social group
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From: Morty
To: Kramer,
George,
Elaine
Document A
From: Newman
To: Jerry,
Frank
Document B
From: Line 6
To: Mark Knopfler,
Clapton,
Page,
Document C
aquatic animalswater guitars
Figure 4.6: Example Document Graph With Users Added.
aquatic animals
Morty Kramer GeorgeElaine Newman Jerry Frank
water
guitars
Line 6 Clapton Page Mark Knopfler
Figure 4.7: Example Document Graph With Users Added.
for the topics. Whispers follows the edges of the document graph and connects all the
recipients within a topic group. The result is a graph rooted by topics with users as the
descendants related to that topic. Recall our 3 document example about fish, and guitars
from Figure 4.5. Imagine the document were sent to individual people as in Figure 4.6.
To build the topic group for each topic, Whispers collects all the users in document.
Figure 4.7 gives the user graph for our 3 document example.
Now a given email will have a given topic distribution. Within the user graph, Whispers
can start at the root node for the given topic. All descendants from that node form that
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email’s social group. Whispers considers an email a leak if a recipient is outside this social
group. Figure 4.4 illustrates a user graph for July 1999.
Algorithm 4.1 High Level Algorithm For Simulating Data Leakage
M ← g e t_me s sa g e()
T ←M .t o pi c()
G← T .d e s c endant s()
R← rand om_u s e r ()
L←M .r ec i pi ent s .a p pend (R)
return ((L 6∈G) == R)
Whispers uses Algorithm 4.1 to simulate a leak. This algorithm returns True if Whis-
pers identifies the person outside of the social group, and False otherwise. For each email in
the document graph, Whispers simulates 500 leaks. The final risk metric for the given topic
is the average rate Whispers incorrectly identifies the injected user given by Equation 4.1.
This results in Figure 4.8.
Ri s k =
False Negatives
Total Emails
(4.1)
4.6 Interpreting Whispers Risk
Figure 4.8 identifies a number of interesting attributes about risk. CTM looked for 10
topics within the corpus in each quarter however, the final tally found 18 (Tables 4.3 - 4.5).
The cosine similarity could not match all topics to each quarter and new topics emerge
out of the data. Of these emerging topics the most interesting from a security perspective
are Topics 16 and 17 shown in Figure 4.9 and Table 4.6.
Topic 16 and 17 emerge on the tail end of Whispers data range. Figure 4.9 shows
the isolated risk of these two topic chains which discuss emails, passwords, and access.
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Figure 4.8: Topic Risk Over Time.
These keywords appear to be red flags with respect to information assurance. In fact this
topic group includes 3640 emails in just two quarters. Certainly this topic group requires
deeper analysis. Whispers tracks which documents contributed to each topic, and allows
one to trace the most influential documents. By tracing the document graph we can read
some of the influential emails. Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show clear security policy violations.
Figure 4.10 shows an IT representative sending a password to a shared resource in cleartext.
Figure 4.10 shows the same person losing his password to an internal database application,
SAP. This sample within the topic chain could be a possible social-engineering attack
attempt by a malicious agent posing as Eric Bass. Whatever the actual motivation here,
Whispers identified a possible threat, and a clear policy violation.
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Figure 4.9: Topics 16 and 17 Emerged From the Tail of the Data Range Examined by
Whispers. They Represent Whispers Ability to Identify New Topics in a Corpus.
Table 4.3: Topics Tracked by Whispers (0 - 5)
Topic-0 Topic-1 Topic-2 Topic-3 Topic-4 Topic-5
legal contract attachment stock energy subject
power transact draf market service forward
product indian file trade power reply
trade counsel trade price market time
meet deal email buy group send
35
Forwarded by Eric Bass/HOU/ECT
Enron North America Corp.
From: Tracey Irvin
To: Eric Bass/HOU/ECT@ECT
Subject: Re: Statistical Database
Eric,
Your password is Packers and it is case-sensitive. Let me know if you
have any problems.
Enron North America Corp.
From: Eric Bass
To: Tracey Irvin/HOU/ECT@ECT
Subject: Statistical Database
I forgot my password to the statistical database. Who should I contact
to find this info.?
Thanks,
Eric
3-0977
Figure 4.10: Sample Documents in Topic 16 (1 of 2)
Table 4.4: Topics Tracked by Whispers (6 - 10)
Topic-6 Topic-7 Topic-8 Topic-9 Topic-10
brazilian gas risk london price
rate deal derivativ equiti model
transact compani manag deal option
customs energi insur stock trade
exchange contract transact buy call
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From: Scott Becken
To: Eric Bass
Subject: Re: SAP Logon ID and Password
Your SAP user ID is P00501250.
Your initial password is your birthdate in YYYYMMDD format.
808333
– Forwarded by Scott Becken/Corp/Enron –
From: Eric Bass @ ECT
To: SAP COE/Corp/Enron@Enron
Subject: SAP Logon ID and Password
How do I go about getting my logon id and password? I seem to have
deleted the e-mail that was sent out. Thanks,
Eric Bass
x30977
Figure 4.11: Sample Documents in Topic 16 (2 of 2)
Table 4.5: Topics Tracked by Whispers (11 - 15)
Topic-11 Topic-12 Topic-13 Topic-14 Topic-15
buy time sara meet chairman
feb work brent subject deal
call day mari will contract
earn go mark enron unit
week year robert sara meter
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Table 4.6: Topics Tracked by Whispers (16 - 17)
Topic-16 Topic-17
request price
list cost
access california
password generat
user suppli
confidenti demand
Topic 17 is less malicious and exemplifies Whispers ability for dynamic discovery of
new threats. As Figure 4.12 shows, Whispers identified California’s Summer 2000 energy
crisis. Now we know this resulted in a huge financial for Enron with increased travel into
the state for trades, and deal making [21], [22]. From a security perspective this means
increased remote VPN access, and remote help desk support. Whispers acts as a predictive
tool to suggest IT resource allocation.
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Forwarded by Carla Hoffman/PDX/ECT
–- Enron Capital & Trade Resources Corp. –-
From: "Pergher, Gunther" <Gunther.Pergher@dowjones.com>
To: "Golden, Mark" <Mark.Golden@dowjones.com>, ...
Subject: DJ BIG PICTURE: Wider Econ Risks In California’s Power Woes
DJ BIG PICTURE: Wider Econ Risks In Californiaś Power Woes
By John McAuley
Of DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
NEW YORK (Dow Jones)–Hot weather and a still-robust economy have
intensified electricity demand in the face of drum-tight power supplies
in California, the nation’s most populous - and, in economic terms, most
important - state.
The resultant rolling "brown outs" and the potential for blackouts
in the future could have a noticeable empirical and real impact on
industrial production in California and even in the national statistics.
...
Figure 4.12: Emerging Market Data From Topic 17
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
Data leaks. It is infeasible to lock down all communication. In the information business
new information emerges continuously. A single leak can cost the company its life, yet
no leakage system can block all leaks. One needs to identify the data at risk. Whispers
presents a novel application of topic models for assessing data leakage risk within an organi-
zation. Section 4.6 demonstrated the experimental results of Whispers, and demonstrates
its potential value as a risk assessment tool. Whispers’ simulation loop assumed it is the
sole component in assessing leakage, however the system can be extended with an organi-
zation’s existing data leakage detection system, or incorporated within a larger solution
such as Cloud Assure. As a component in a larger solution it provides an intuitive and
impartial method to evaluate the effectiveness of various security policies.
Recall, Frank H. Knight states that the difference between uncertainty and risk is that
risk can be measured [5]. Whispers transforms uncertainty into measurable risk.
5.1 Future Work
5.1.1 People’s “Connectedness”
Whispers estimates risk by inserting a random user into a recipient list, then checking if
all the recipients exist in the same topic group. Some people however are highly connected,
and are part of multiple social groups in their normal business. These people could slip
malicious information between social groups undetected. Whispers identifies the topics as
high risk, but does not make an effort to identify the people who contribute to the topic’s
elevated risk. In a sense these highly connected people reduce Whispers’ ability to identify
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simulated leaks since those people are connected to so many social groups. Instead of
simulating leaks by adding random recipients, one could look at the degree of users in the
social network to further identify risk. A personal risk metric paired with Whispers risk
metric could provide a powerful and useful value for identifying and evaluating security
policies.
5.1.2 Interpreted and Native Code
Whispers’ implementation is a mixture of C++ and Python. Specifically the topic
models and the database are implemented in native code (C and C++). Much Whispers
however is implemented in Python augmented with NumPy. There is a clear opportunity
for reducing the time Whispers take to evaluate the user graph. Whispers’ reliance on
interpreted code currently renders it unable to provide a real-time online answer to data
leakage questions.
For the Enron email data set used during testing the topic estimation step took 28 hours
43 minutes to estimate topics for 266,000 emails on an AMD 1090T X6 processor. Further
analysis showed a majority of the time is spent in Python’s NLTK while processing tf-idf.
Improving this implementation or distributing the computation could have a large impact
on the practicality of Whispers. This however could be improved by converting the tf-idf
algorithms from Python’s NTLK library to a C++ implementation.
The leakage simulation, which is highly parallelizeable took 3 days on similar hardware.
This time is not realistic for a real-time risk analysis tool. Similarly, the graph analysis is
done in Python. The final year of data required 7,200 minutes to estimate.
5.1.3 Alternative Vocabulary Pruning
tf-idf is a standard method of determining valuable words in a corpus. However there
is some promising research within the space of “information gain”. “Information gain”
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during some experiments at Etsy.com actually identified and removed the stop words [16].
Traditionally as a preprocessor step, stop word removal utilizes standard lists specific to
each language which enumerate words of syntax and structure which themselves provide
no information. “Information gain” however showed it can identify stop words as mean-
ingless. This could be especially effective in a noisy corpus, or in corpus with domain
specific stop words, i.e., words which within the domain are so common they provide no
value.
5.1.4 Whispers’ Reliance on Now
Whispers only calculates topic models for one quarter at a time. After the topic model
is formed for that quarter it attempts to match topics with the previous quarter. If a topic
from previous quarter is masked by the present topics,Whispers can not evaluate its current
risk and assumes no one is talking about that particular topic. Since no one is talking about
that topic, Whispers is left to assume the topic has zero risk. Intuitively this does not make
sense and Whispers could be extended to evaluate risk for topics hidden by the present
assessment. Blei’s Dynamic Topic Models (DTM) could be an excellent start in this effort
[35], [36].
5.1.5 Privacy
Privacy is an issue with Whispers. Whispers looks at all email in the company. This
presents serious privacy implications, especially in countries which restrict this type of
data mining. The Enron email set is unique in that it is a curated data set and personal
and private information have been largely removed. While this curating helps improve
Whispers’ accuracy, it exemplifies the need to anonymize and protect personal information
for future implementations.
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